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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
(

f

ZELLA GYGI, as Administratrix
of rhe Estate of DAVID ALAN GYGI,
vs.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

LOIS STORCH and THE TRAVELERS
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

I

(

Case No.

12834

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by respondent, Lois Storch, to recover
the proceeds of a life insurance policy in which she is named
as beneficiary. In a separate action, the appellant, Zella Gygi,
as administratrix of the estate of David Alan Gygi, seeks damages for emotional distress allegedly caused by respondent,
Lois Storch, to the deceased. The cases were consolidated by
the trial court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The respondent filed a complaint in the District Court
of Salt Lake County against The Travelers Insurance Companies. The appellant filed a complaint against respondent

;u-:d The Travelers Insurance Companies. The cases were coosolidat::d and the insurance company paid the proceeds from
t
the life insurance policy into court. Subsequent to the consolidation of the cases and the payment of the proceeds into
court, the respondent moved the lower court for summary
judgment and her motion was granted by Judge James s. '
Sawaya. The court ordered that the proceeds of the policy be
paid to respondent and dismissed appellant's complaint with 1 0
prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial court
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In approximately November, 1970, the respondent met
David Alan Gygi, now deceased. Some time after their meeting, they commenced dating each other on an irregular basis,
which dating continued until the death of Mr. Gygi in July,
1971. During the time the respondent and the deceased knew
each other, the respondent was thirty-seven years old, divorced
and the mother of eight children. The deceased was twenty·
seven years old, single, apparently in fine health, and employed by Univac in Salt Lake City, Utah as a technician.
In March, 1971, David Alan Gygi applied for and received group life insurance through his employer. In his application for insurance, he designated the respondent, Lois Storch,
as the beneficiary and listed her relationship to him as that of
"friend". No alternate beneficiary was designated. (R. 23,

!

R. 25 ).
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At no time prior to his death did David Alan Gygi inform respondent that he had made her the beneficiary of any
insurance policy. (Deposition of respondent, Pages 29, 30
::r.d 51; Deposition of Janet Rider, Page 35).
During the course of their relationship, the respondent
and rhe deceased continued to date other persons (Deposition
of respondent, Pages 4 7, 56) ; the deceased never offered respondtnt an engagement ring (Deposition of respondent,
Page 56); never gave her any gifts (Deposition of respondtnt, Pages 52, 29); and never gave her any money (Deposition
of respondent, Page 5 7). Although the respondent and the
deceased talked about marriage, the respondent never consented to marry the deceased, nor did she make any requests
or demands of him (Deposition of respondent, Pages 49, 50,
52, 56 and 58; Deposition of Janet Rider, Page 29). The
respondent did nothing more than refuse to marry the deceased, and throughout the entire course of their relationshp
she made her unwillingness to marry Mr. Gygi clear to him.
(Deposition of respondent, Pages 49, 50, 52, 56 and 58; Deposition of Janet Rider, Pages 16-17, 29, 35). Respondent had
no indication that the deceased was immature, unstable or
suicidal (Deposition of respondent, Page 5 3; Deposition of

Janet Rider, Pages 30, 31 and 32).

In July, 1971, David Alan Gygi died allegedly by his
own hand, and it was after his death that respondent became
aware that she had been designated beneficiary of the above
described insurance policy.
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ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN RULING THAT THE APPELLANT
HAD NO CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON
HER CONTENTION THAT RESPONDENT
SUBJECTED APPELLANT'S SON TO SUCH
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS THAT HE TOOK HIS
OWN LIFE.
The only point raised by appellant is that the respondent
"inflicted emotional distress upon David Alan Gygi to such an
extent that he took his own life." (Appellant's Brief, Page 10)
The precise cause of action alleged by appellant is not clear
from her brief. If she is claiming damages for the emotional
distress and suffering allegedly caused David Alan Gygi before
his death, it is clear that under Section 7 8-11-7, Utah Code
Annotated 195 3, no cause of action for pain and suffering,
physical or emotional, survived his death. If her claim is one
for wrongful death, the mere refusal of marriage does not give
any basis for a wrongful death action, and even if it did, appellant has failed to establish any causal connection between respondent's actions and Mr. Gygi's death. No matter what
appellant's theory is, it is apparent that none of appellant's
contentions relate in any way to the insurance proceeds.
Therefore, whatever the ruling of the court, respondent is
clearly entitled to the insurance proceeds.
The appellant recites authorities with which respondent
has no basic disagreement. However, there is no evidence that
respondent's conduct would be actionable under any of the
authorities cited by appellant. In a case involving an entirely
different factual background, the Utah case of Samms v. Eccles,
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! 1 Utah 2d 289, 358 P. 2d 344 ( 1961), held that a cause of
action for emotional distress may not be based on mere negliarnce. In that case, the court said:
0

"Our study of the authorities and of the arguments advanced, convinces us that, conceding such a
cause of action may not be based upon mere negligence,
the best considered view recognizes an action for severe
emotional distress, when not accompanied by bodily
impact or physical injury, where the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or ( b) where any reasonable person would have
known that such would result; and his actions are of
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality."
See also Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 23
Utah 2d 252, 461 P. 2d 466 (1969); and Wood 11. United
Airlines, Inc., 404 F. 2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968).
Therefore, before a cause of action exists for emotional
distress, the respondent must have engaged in some outrageous
and/or intentional conduct with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress or with knowledge that such distress would
likely result.
The respondent did nothing which intentionally or unreasonably subjected David Alan Gygi to emotional distress,
nor would her conduct cause an average member of the community to condemn her actions as outrageous and intolerable
or offensive to the generally accepted standards of decency
and morality.
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Despite appellant's attempts to make the respondent ap.
i:x=ar to be a designing woman who took advantage of the deceased, the facts are clearly the opposite. The respondent exercised great consideration for David Alan Gygi and was straightforward and honest with him throughout their relationship.
The only improper action alleged by the appellant is that the
respondent refused to marry the deceased. It is understandable
that in many cases such conduct could cause emotional
tress, as is the case in many situations when a woman refuses
an offer of matrimony. One soon learns as he goes through life
that the female of the species can continue to inflict emotional
suffering upon the male. However much the males of the
world may wish otherwise, the law has never recognized this
cause of action to be "extreme and outrageous conduct or intentional and unreasonable conduct" for which a cause of ac·
tion will lie. With the women's liberation movement firmly
established, it is now too late for the courts to take such a
drastic step in judicial legislation.
From the facts before the court, it is obvious that none of
the four points set forth on Pages 10-11 of appellant's brief
have any merit. With regard to those points, respondent asserts
the following:
POINT 1: Both the respondent and Janet Rider felt
that David Alan Gygi was stable and mature. He was twenty·
seven years old, had served in the United States Army, appeared
to be in good health, and was holding down a responsible
position as a technician with an important firm. He never
mentioned to respondent or Janet Rider that he would take
his own life if circumstances did not go his way.

G

POINTS 2 and 3: The allegations of Points 2 and 3
appear to claim that a woman is liable for any and all consequences if she refuses a man's proposal of marriage when he
is infatuated and in love with her and spends a great deal of
rime with her. To permit a cause of action based upon the
tmotional distress suffered by men and women whose love is
unrequited is absolutely ridiculous. Moreover, the complete
honesty and good faith of Lois Storch is evidenced throughout
her deposition and the deposition of Janet Rider.
POINT 4: Point 4 attempts to make a claim that the
respondent suddenly and with knowledge of the probable
consequences told the deceased she would not marry him. The
facts clearly show that Lois Storch had repeatedly told the deceased she would not marry him and finally terminated the
relationship.
CONCLUSION
The respondent is the lawful beneficiary under the insurance policy (R. 19), and the appellant does not dispute
that she was lawfully designated as beneficiary and remained
the beneficiary until the death of David Alan Gygi. The appellant no longer contends that the insurance policy was conditional upon any event, nor is there any evidence that the deceased changed or intended to change the beneficiary before
his death ( R. 26) .
In Scherer v. Wahlstrom, 318 S.W. 2d 456 (1958), a
Texas case with facts much like those of the instant case, the
beneficiary was awarded the proceeds of an insurance policy
as against the parents of the deceased even though she was
7

engaged to the deceased at the time of her designation as bene
ficiary, but married to another at the insured's death. There
was evidence that the insured had obtained a change of bene
f iciary form but failed to fill it out and return it before hi>
death. The court ruled that where no change of beneficiary was
completed, the lawfully designated beneficiary was entitled to
the proceeds.
The summary judgment granted by the trial court SUS·
raining the right of the respondent to the insurance proceed>
and dismissing appellant's complaint with prejudice should be
sustained and affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
By Sam F. Chamberlain
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

